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CRIMINAL LAW AND/AS POLITICAL THEORY 
Stephen Galoob*
VINCENT CHIAO, CRIMINAL LAW IN THE AGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP. 288. HARDCOVER $99.00. 
ERIN KELLY, THE LIMITS OF BLAME: RETHINKING PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP. 240.
HARDCOVER $35.00. 
INTRODUCTION: CRIMINAL LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY
How, if at all, do core questions of political philosophy (such as the legitimacy of 
WKHVWDWH¶VDXWKRULW\DQGWKHFRQWRXUVRIDMXVWVRFLHW\PDWWHUWRWKLQNLQJDERXWFULPLQDO
law? Roughly, most criminal law theorists over the past sixty years have answered this 
question in one of two ways. 
Approach 1 sees criminal law as distinct from political theory. Fundamental 
questions about the former do not depend on insights from the latter. The logic of this 
position is encapsulated in the following passage from an eminent scholar: 
[P]olitical philosophy²the theory of the state²is for the most part unimportant for purposes 
of doing work in criminal law theory. . . . Good work in criminal law theory must suggest 
paths to resolving concrete problems that can be taken from one or several of the plausible 
political starting points. But there is rarely mileage to be gained, in terms of criminal law 
theory, from sorting out which is the appropriate theory of the state.1
Approach 1 is the predominant position among theorists in what Michael Davis has 
FDOOHGWKH³JROGHQKDOIFHQWXU\´RIFULPLQDOODZtheory.2 Often, those who adopt Approach 
                                                          
*Stephen Galoob is Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. Thanks to Vincent Chiao and 
Erin Kelly for their feedback on a prior version of this review. Thanks also to Chad Flanders, whose curiosity 
inspired this review and whose modesty precluded him from taking credit as a co-author. This work is supported 
in part by a summer research grant from the University of Tulsa College of Law. 
 1. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Mathematician, the Monk, and the Militant: Reflections on the Role of 
Criminal Law Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 705, 707 (2000). The notion that punishment theory bears no necessary 
relationship to political theory is shared by many other commentators. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Punishment 
Theory’s Golden Half Century: A Survey of Developments from (About) 1957 to 2007, 13 J. ETHICS 73, 97 (2009) 
(³The problems of understanding punishment do not seem to change much because of who (or what) administers 
the institution. That seems a good reason not to require a theory of punishment to explain the role of government 
in punishment.´). 
2. Davis, supra note 1, at 73±74. Among those who adopt Approach 1 are LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY 
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1 construe their project as vindicating the internal or immanent logic of criminal law,3
RULHQWLQJ WKHLU DQDO\VLV DURXQG TXHVWLRQV VXFK DV ³ZKDW LV WKH PRUDO MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU
FULPLQDOSXQLVKPHQW"´DQG³KRZPXFKVKRXOGDQRIIHQGHUEHSXQLVKHG"´4 Even theorists 
who take opposing positions in these debates are nevertheless united in their embrace of 
Approach 1.5
Approach 2 sees criminal law fundamentally as a topic in political philosophy. On 
this approach, as George FOHWFKHUFRQWHQGV³Whe first question that must be asked is . . . 
>Z@KDWPDNHVLWOHJLWLPDWHIRUWKHVWDWHWRPDNHSHRSOHVXIIHU"´6 In other words, criminal 
justice institutions not only invite the same questions about coercion and legitimacy that 
apply to other political institutions, but also call for evaluation via generally-applicable 
(rather than domain-specific) principles of political justification.7
                                                          
KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 6 (2009) (³When we say that [one 
who chooses to violate legal norms deserve punishment], we are invoking the reactive attitude that punishment 
of a certain amount is a fitting response to the choice. Thus, the criminal law both creates and reflects value by 
announcing which conduct is sufficiently wrong to deserve blame and punishment.´); MICHAEL MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 33 (1997) (³My own theory [of criminal law] is 
that criminal law is a functional kind whose function is to attain retributive justice.´); VICTOR TADROS, THE 
ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 23 (2011) (³[T]his book defends the view that 
punishment can be justified only in virtue of its instrumental value. But it does so in the light of a non-
consequentialist view of morality.´). 
3. Compare Stephen Morse, Compatibilist Criminal Law, in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT 107, 131 
(Thomas A. Nadelhoffer ed., 2013) (distinguishing between internal and external challenges to practices of 
criminal responsibility and contending that, because ³[t]he criminal law is the product of centuries of 
development,´ the ³burden of persuasion´ in critiquing these practices ³is surely on the external challengers´), 
with ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL JUSTICE 14 (2009) (³Were 
we to understand penal law solely with reference to conceptions of freedom internal to it, we would perhaps have 
achieved a faithful understanding; but we would not have justified the law as having normative force for anyone 
but those already committed to those conceptions.´). 
 4. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 2, at 30 (³The first question of a theory of the criminal law is the question 
of why we punish.´); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From “Why 
Punish?” to “How Much?”, 25 ISR. L. REV. 549 (1991). 
 5. In debates about punishment theory, for example, retributivists and their critics often adopt Approach 1. 
Compare Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 260 (2008) (stating theories of 
punishment ³are moral claims in response to the proposition that punishment stands in need of justification. If 
theories of punishment are thus situated ab initio within an argumentative dialectic, one might expect their 
persuasiveness to depend, in part, on how fully and satisfactorily they understand the proposition to which they 
aim to respond.´), with Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of Just Punishment, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 843, 975 (2002) (³Unless retributivism departs from the formula of desert as the sole justification 
for punishment, it is circular or empty. But once retributivism departs from desert as the sole justification for 
punishment by resorting to consequences, and since the consequences may be obtained by punishing an offender 
without desert, retributivism is subject to the very same problems of consequentialist theories²justifying 
intentional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents and the use of offenders as mere means.´). 
 6. George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 697±98 (2000). 
 7. Perhaps the most prominent exemplar of Approach 2 is JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST 
DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990). Other works adopting Approach 2 include 
Corey Brettschneider, The Rights of the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy, 35 POL. THEORY 175 
(2007); Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307 (2004); 
Chad Flanders, Punishment, Liberalism, and Public Reason, 36 CRIM. J. ETHICS 61 (2017); Alice Ristroph, The 
Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 305 (2018); TOMMIE SHELBY, DARK 
GHETTOS: INJUSTICE, DISSENT, AND REFORM (2016); Malcolm Thorburn, Criminal Law as Public Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 21 (Antony R. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011); Ekow N. 
Yankah, Republican Responsibility in Criminal Law, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 457 (2015). 
As with nearly all dichotomies, the one described in the text is false. Some theorists take an intermediate approach 
on which political theory entails criminal law theory, or vice versa. For some, theorizing about criminal law 
serves to illustrate or vindicate an antecedently preferred political theory. See CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN,
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The lines delineating these two approaches are permeable. Many criminal law 
theorists have taken more than one approach over the course of their careers8 and, indeed, 
within the same work.9 What, if anything, hangs on theorizing from one of these 
approaches rather than the other? 
9LQFHQW &KLDR¶V Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State and Erin 
.HOO\¶V The Limits of Blame: Rethinking Punishment and Responsibility are both 
specimens of Approach 2, albeit to varying degrees. Both works demonstrate how 
theorizing criminal law as a subset of political theory is likely to differ from the 
predominant position. 
I. CHIAO ON CRIMINAL LAW AS PUBLIC LAW
&KLDR¶VERRNSURYLGHVWKHPRVWVXVWDLQHGDQGIRUFHIXOGHIHQVHWRGDWHRIFRQVWUXLQJ
FULPLQDO ODZ DV D WRSLF LQ SROLWLFDO WKHRU\ &KLDR FRQWHQGV WKDW ³FULPLQDO ODZ DQG LWV
associated institutions are . . . subject to the same principles of institutional and political 
HYDOXDWLRQWKDWDSSO\WRSXEOLFODZDQGSXEOLFLQVWLWXWLRQVJHQHUDOO\´10 Therefore, Chiao 
DUJXHV WKHRULHV RI FULPLQDO ODZ VKRXOG DLP WR ³OLYH XS WR D IXOO\ SROLWLFDO VWDQGDUG RI
MXVWLILFDWLRQ´11 UDWKHUWKDQHQGHDYRULQJWRFDSWXUHRUUHIOHFW³WKHQRUPVRILQWHUSHUVRQDO
PRUDOLW\´12
&KLDR¶VFRUHDUJXPHQWUHVWVRQVHYHUDOLQVLJKWV&KLDR¶VILUVWLPSRUWDQWSRLQWLVWR
GHIHQGZKDWDIWHU0DOFROP7KRUEXUQKHFDOOVWKH³SXEOLFODZ´XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFULPLnal 
ODZ WKH QRWLRQ WKDW WKH ³same HYDOXDWLYH VWDQGDUG VKRXOG DSSO\´ WR FULPLQDO ODZ
institutions as applies to other political or social institutions that engage in coercive rule 
enforcement.13 For Chiao, the case for the public law understanding follows from 
DSSUHFLDWLQJWKHUROHRIFULPLQDOODZLQ³VWDELOL]>LQJ@DSXEOLFVHQVHRIMXVWLFHE\SURYLGLQJ
assurance that cooperation with legal rules will not leave one open to victimization or 
H[SORLWDWLRQ´14 The public law understanding also addresses a series of problems that are 
raised by the US case of Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.: namely, 
whether criminal law institutions should be assessed in isolation and construed as 
condemning wrongful or harmful actions ex post, or whether they should be assessed based 
on their contribution to the protection of moral entitlements (which requires appraising 
                                                          
RIGHTS FORFEITURE AND PUNISHMENT (2017); A. John Simmons, Locke and the Right to Punish, 20 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 311 (1991). As Michael Davis noted regarding fairness-based theories of punishment, those who take 
this approach adopt a theory of punishment ³because it fits a moral (or political) theory that is their main focus.´
Davis, supra note 1, at 94. 
 8. For example, Gideon Yaffe¶s work on attempts analyzes the criminalization of attempts along the lines 
of Approach 1. See GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (2010). 
However, Yaffe¶s work on the justification for punishing juvenile offenders less than adult offenders ultimately 
offers a political resolution consonant with Approach 2: that legal institutions have lesser legitimacy over juvenile 
offenders ³because of the political meaning of age.´ GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND 
THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 125 (2018). 
 9. As discussed below, the first four chapters of Erin Kelly¶s The Limits of Blame might be construed as 
adopting Approach 1, while the remainder of the book clearly takes Approach 2. 
 10. VINCENT CHIAO, CRIMINAL LAW IN THE AGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE vii (2018). 
 11. Id. at viii. 
 12. Id. at 51. 
 13. Id. at 56. 
 14. Id. at 37. 
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them in continuity with other social and political institutions).15 The public law 
understanding strongly favors the latter. 
This public law understanding contrasts with the notions, predominant among 
criminal law theorists, that the goal of criminal law is to vindicate private rights and that 
the legitimacy of criminal law is a question of whether criminal punishments track 
offHQGHUV¶GHVHUW16 However plausible such deontological and/or retributivist approaches 
are as a description of interpersonal morality, Chiao argues, they are implausible as 
SROLWLFDO PRUDOLW\ EHFDXVH WKH\ DUH ³DQWLGHPRFUDWLF LOOLEHUDO UHVHQWIXO DQG PRUH
concerned with the righteousness of those who punish than with the interests of those who 
DUHPDGHWREHDULWVFRVWV´17 They also cannot appreciate the Deshaney problems because 
they assess criminal justice institutions largely in isolation from other political and social 
institutions.18
To see criminal law as a species of public law is to embrace Approach 2. Yet, Chiao 
concedes, identifying the appropriate connection between criminal law and political theory 
does not establish the content of criminal law²that is, the specific goals that criminal law 
institutions should pursue and the means by which they should pursue them. To begin 
resolving these questions, Chiao articulates a substantive theory of criminal law based on 
the ideal of democratic egalitarianisPRU³DQWL-GHIHUHQFH´19 DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK³SXEOLF
LQVWLWXWLRQVVKRXOGVWULYHWRSURPRWHHIIHFWLYHDFFHVVWRFHQWUDOFDSDELOLW\IRUDOO´WKDWLV
consistent with assigning an equal status to all.20 This theory, in turn, grounds several 
principles for evaluating criminal justice institutions, including the principles of equal 
opportunity for influence (the notion that those subject to political institutions should have 
³DQHTXDORSSRUWXQLW\WRZHLJKLQRQ . EDVLFSROLFLHVDQGYDOXHV´21 anti-subordination 
(i.e. WKDW FULPLQDO MXVWLFH LQVWLWXWLRQV VKRXOG QRW EH XVHG WR ³HQWUHQFK REMHFWLRQDEOH
SDWWHUQVRI VWDWXV KLHUDUFK\´22 optimality (the idea that, because criminal punishment 
QHFHVVDULO\ LPSDLUV DQ RIIHQGHU¶V ³VWDWXV DV DQ HTXDO´ FULPLQDO SXQLVKPHQW VKRXld be 
reserved only for the most serious offenses against victims),23 and inclusive aggregation 
WKDW ³FULPLQDO MXVWLFH LQWHUYHQWLRQV´ VKRXOG EH HYDOXDWHG ³LQ WHUPV RI >WKHLU@ RYHUDOO
impact on effective access to central capabilit[ies], with priority for the interests of those 
ZKRVHDFFHVVWRWKRVHFDSDELOLWLHVLVOHDVWVHFXUH´24
After working out the anti-deference theory and its subsidiary principles in chapters 
one through three, Chiao analyzes an array of questions related to criminal justice, from 
the justifiability of mass incarceration,25 WKH OHJLWLPDF\ RI FULPLQDOL]LQJ ³KDUPOHVV´
                                                          
 15. CHIAO, supra note 10, at 247±48. 
 16. Id. at 28. 
 17. Id. at 256. 
 18. Id. at 32±33. 
 19. Id. at 72. In describing the anti-deference conception, Chiao invokes the work of Elizabeth Anderson, 
Niko Kolodny, and (most importantly) Phillip Pettit. 
 20. CHIAO, supra note 10, at 73. 
 21. Id. at 77. 
 22. Id. at 86. 
 23. Id. at 90. 
 24. Id. at 96. 
 25. In chapter four, Chiao contends that any adequate theory of punishment ³must be open to considering the 
aggregate costs and benefits of a system of punishment´ and have the resources to criticize excessively punitive 
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wrongdoing and mala prohibita,26 the due process distinctions between criminal and civil 
law,27 and the connection between criminal justice institutions and other social and 
political institutions.28 In these chapters, Chiao offers new theoretical insights on vital 
questions in ongoing debates. Chiao also spells out the incapacity of deontological and 
retributive theories to appreciate the importance of many of these questions. Because of 
the vitality of such questions, this incapacity suggests the need to reconsider these modes 
of theorizing. 
&KLDR¶VPRVWIDU-reaching contribution is to vindicate the public law understanding 
of criminal law, a view that calls for a wholesale reevaluation of the predominant way of 
thinking about criminal law. The public law understanding shows why theorists should 
HPEUDFH$SSURDFKDQGUHMHFW$SSURDFK7KHPDJQLWXGHRI&KLDR¶VDFKLHYHPHQWFDQ
be appreciated regardless of whether one agrees with DOO RU UHDOO\DQ\RI WKHERRN¶V
main arguments about the cooperation-facilitating case for the public law understanding, 
the anti-deference theory of criminal law, and the specific principles that derive from that 
theory. Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State reorients what criminal law 
theory is about and illuminates where it should go. 
II. KELLY ON CRIMINAL LAW WITHOUT BLAME
(ULQ .HOO\¶V The Limits of Blame takes a different route to the conclusion that 
criminal law theory is a topic in political theory. Unlike Chiao, Kelly more fully inhabits 
Approach 1 before using its inadequacies to build the case for Approach 2. For Kelly, 
SUHGRPLQDQWUHWULEXWLYLVWWKHRULHVRISXQLVKPHQWKROGWKDW³>W@KHVWDWHVKRXOGHQVXUHWKDW
                                                          
systems of mass incarceration (such as, ex hypothesi, the one realized in the contemporary United States). CHIAO,
supra note 10, at 112±13. ³Strictly deontological´ theories of punishment justify punishment solely in terms of 
deontological considerations such as an offender¶s deservingness or forfeiture of right not to be punished. Id. at 
114. These theories are inadequate to the task because they focus only on individual offenders. Id. at 130. By 
contrast, the anti-deference theory can provide a basis for criticizing such a system based on its aggregate social 
costs, which undermine the possibility of political equality. Id. at 138. 
 26. In chapter five, Chiao argues that, on the public law conception, there is no ³core´ to criminal law²that 
³we should reject the idea that the criminal law is essentially prohibitory rather than regulatory in function.´ Id.
at 158. From this point, it follows that the decision whether to criminalize a pattern of conduct ³is subject to 
justification under a fully political standard,´ and that ³any subject-matter-based constraints [on criminalization] 
must themselves be justified under that standard, rather than as a matter of the freestanding morality of the 
criminal law.´ Id. at 160. Chiao¶s thesis here differs from the conclusion, advanced by Stephen Garvey (and, as 
discussed below, Kelly), that the state¶s authority to criminalize malum in se is not contingent on its political 
legitimacy. See Stephen P. Garvey, Injustice, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in THE PUNITIVE IMAGINATION:
LAW, JUSTICE, AND RESPONSIBILITY 42 (Austin Sarat ed., 2014). 
 27. In chapter six, Chiao argues for a ³pragmatist´ approach to delineating criminal and civil law, which he 
contrasts with the ³formalist´ approach that characterizes the United States Supreme Court¶s jurisprudence. 
CHIAO, supra note 10, at 182±83. The main difference between these approaches is that pragmatism would apply 
the more-rigorous standards of criminal due process to all matters that affect central capabilities (such as the 
collateral consequences, deportation, pretrial detention, and civil commitment), while many of these topics are 
deemed essentially civil under the formalist approach. Id. at 210±19. 
 28. In chapter seven, Chiao provides a sustained argument why, under the public law conception, 
administrative states should ³often favor crime prevention,´ which implicate institutions outside of the criminal 
justice system, ³over punitive response.´ Id. at 222. On Chiao¶s argument, the egalitarian state should aim for a 
purely remedial criminal law. Id. at 230±31. Nor should it be agnostic between the choice between funding 
institutions that aim to ³strengthen[] capacities for moral deliberation and choice´ and those that ³respond[] to 
poor exercises of that agency with official forms of censure, blame, and punishment´ (or, in Chiao¶s memorable 
phrasing, the choice between ³schools, now and prisons, later´). Id. at 228. 
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criminals get the puQLVKPHQWWKH\GHVHUYH´29 Kelly initially shows that such retributivist 
theories are inadequate on their own terms, then argues why the criminal justice system 
should not be animated by blame. Rather, criminal justice institutions should aim to reduce 
the harm that crime does by deterring criminal behavior, incapacitating people who pose 
ongoing danger to others, addressing the causes of crime, and redressing the harm that 
criminal actions create. 
In chapters one through four, Kelly offers an internal critique of retributivism. 
Retributivists see punishment as a kind of public blaming that offenders deserve.30 For the 
retributivist, criminal responsibility is a subset of moral responsibility, since both 
categories of appraisal are based on essentially the same considerations. If anything, Kelly 
contends, the blaming function of punishment requires the criteria for attributing criminal 
responsibility to be more stringent than those for attributing moral responsibility, given 
WKH³VHULRXVFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHVWLJPDRIFULPLQDOLW\´31
However, Kelly argues, this picture of the fit between criminal and moral 
responsibility rings false. There is a mismatch between criminal punishment and moral 
EODPHZRUWKLQHVV³WKHFULWHULDRI OHJDOJXLOWDQGSXQLVKPHQW LQRXUV\VWHP are not well 
FDOLEUDWHGWRMXGJPHQWVRIEODPHZRUWKLQHVVDQGGHVHUW´32 Considerations that diminish or 
defeat moral responsibility are often irrelevant to assessing criminal responsibility. For 
example, some views attribute moral responsibility on the basis of competence. On these 
views, a person with diminished moral competence might not be fully morally 
blameworthy for their action. Yet existing criteria for attributing criminal responsibility 
are insensitive to such considerations of diminished moral competence.33
Therefore, Kelly argues, the retributivist must take one of two problematic routes: 
either embrace an implausible notion of moral responsibility (on which, for example, an 
DJHQW¶VJHQHUDOFDSDFLWLHVIRUDFWLRQDQGRUVSHFLILFKLVWRU\DQGPRWLYDWLRns for action are 
irrelevant) as the basis for criminal responsibility; or else deny that moral and criminal 
responsibility are species of the same genus. For Kelly, neither of these routes leads to a 
plausible account of retributive justice. Moreover, neither strategy would survive the 
scrutiny applied to public policy in a legitimate democratic state: UHWULEXWLYLVPHLWKHU³ILW>V@
SRRUO\´ZLWKWKHH[LVWLQJFULWHULDRIFULPLQDOOLDELOLW\RUHOVHLWIDLOVWRIXOILOORXUFROOHFWLYH
REOLJDWLRQ³WKURXJKODZWRUHGUHVVYLRODWLRQVRILQGLYLGXDO ULJKWV´LQYROYHGLQFULPLQDO
wrongdoing.34
Kelly articulates an alternative approach to justifying criminal justice institutions 
EDVHGRQKDUPUHGXFWLRQ,QDMXVWVRFLHW\³>W@KHSUDFWLFHRISXQLVKPHQWZRXOGEHXVHG
only to prevent and to redress the harms caused by criminal wrongdoing, especially the 
FULPLQDO YLRODWLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDO ULJKWV´35 Kelly sees harm reduction as a principle to 
                                                          
 29. ERIN KELLY, THE LIMITS OF BLAME: RETHINKING PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 17 (2018). 
 30. Id. at 6±7.
 31. Id. at 48. The idea that standards for criminal responsibility are a more-demanding subset of moral 
responsibility is widely shared among criminal law theorists. See, e.g., Antony Duff, Legal and Moral 
Responsibility, 4 PHIL. COMPASS 978 (2009). 
 32. KELLY, supra note 29, at 18. 
 33. Id. at 46±53. 
 34. Id. at 119±20. 
 35. Id. at 122. 
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animate both criminalization and punishment.36 For Kelly, generally-applicable criteria 
IRUSXEOLFMXVWLILFDWLRQZRXOGOLFHQVHWKHFUHDWLRQRIDFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHPWR³HVWDEOLVK
and sustain an effective, credible, and fair system of threats, with the aim of protecting 
SHRSOH¶VEDVLFULJKWVDQGOLEHUWLHVE\LQFDSDFLWDWLQJFULPLQDOZURQJGRers, deterring crime, 
UHIRUPLQJODZEUHDNHUVDQGUHGUHVVLQJKDUPV´37 The focus of criminal justice would be 
wrongful conduct, and morally blaming offenders would play no important role. 
Still, Kelly argues, this harm reduction rationale must also be constrained by 
DVVHVVPHQWVRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSV\FKRORJLFDODQGVRFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQFOXGLQJZKHWKHU
the defendant enjoyed a reasonable opportunity to comply with the law.38 It should also 
be constrained by background social injustices applicable in a specific case. Here, Kelly 
WDNHV DPRGHUDWH DSSURDFK6HYHUH LQMXVWLFHVXQGHUPLQH WKH VWDWH¶V DXWKRULW\ WRSXQLVK
altogether.39 By contrast, less severe injustices limit (without undermining) the legitimacy 
of criminal justice institutions: under such conditions, iQGLYLGXDOV DUH ³OLDEOH WR
SXQLVKPHQWRQO\IRUDFWVWKDWDUHPRUDOO\ZURQJ´EXWQRWIRU³DFWVWKDWDUHPHUHO\OHJDOO\
SURKLELWHG´40
2QHPLJKWWDNHLVVXHZLWK.HOO\¶VVSHFLILFFRQFOXVLRQV)RUH[DPSOHLWLVXQOLNHO\
WKDW.HOO\¶V FULWLTXHRI UHWULEXWLYLVPZill convince a thoroughgoing retributivist of the 
error of their ways.41 6HFRQG D 5DZOVLDQ PLJKW TXLEEOH ZLWK .HOO\¶V KDUP UHGXFWLRQ
rationale for the criminal justice system on the grounds that it does not provide sufficient 
justification for the deployment of coercion in light of the possibility of non-coercive 
interventions.42 )LQDOO\ RQH PLJKW FRQWHVW .HOO\¶V PRGHUDWH FRQFOXVLRQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH
delegitimating effects of background and historical injustices.43 Given the significant and 
entrenched patterns of racial injustice that characterize contemporary Western nations, the 
case for abolitionism might be stronger than Kelly (or, for that matter, Chiao) allows. 
1RQHWKHOHVV.HOO\¶VERRNLVDQDFKLHYHPHQWLWPDNHVWKHFDVHIRU$SSURDFKLQWHUPV
that are too powerful for retributivists to ignore. 
CONCLUSION: CRIMINAL LAW AS POLITICAL THEORY
Suppose you are persuaded by Chiao and Kelly that criminal law theory is 
fundamentally a topic in political theory. How would criminal law theory oriented around 
Approach 2 differ from one oriented around Approach 1? Here are a few conjectures 
LQVSLUHGE\&KLDR¶VDQG.HOO\¶VERRNV
2QHLPSOLFDWLRQLVWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIZKDWDIWHU&KLDRPLJKWEHFDOOHG³Deshaney
                                                          
 36. Id. at 122±32. 
 37. KELLY, supra note 29, at 144. 
 38. Id. at 134. 
 39. Id. at 163. 
 40. Id. at 174. 
 41. For the retributivist, some of the force of Kelly¶s critique of retributivism might be blunted by conceding 
that criminal responsibility is not a subset of moral responsibility, so that any asymmetries in attributional criteria 
do not necessarily confound the retributive project. Indeed, some contend that this relationship characterizes 
contemporary criminal law. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship 
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
 42. See Nathan Hanna, Liberalism and the General Justifiability of Punishment, 145 PHIL. STUD. 325 (2009). 
 43. See Stephen Galoob & Stephen Winter, Injustice, Reparation, and Legitimacy, in 5 OXFORD STUDIES IN 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 65, 68±71 (David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & Steven Wall eds., 2019). 
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SUREOHPV´ $VVHVVLQJ WKH MXVWLILFDWLRQ DQG OHJLWLPDF\ RI FULminal justice institutions 
requires analyzing a host of other social institutions oriented toward the provision of basic 
ULJKWVDQGRSSRUWXQLWLHV$V.HOO\SXWVLW³>L@QRUGHUWRµVROYH¶WKHSUREOHPRIFULPHD
society would have to make a commitment that goes beyond criminal justice. It would 
need to address the causes of crime, which is something a criminal justice system does not 
GR´44 The holistic assessment needed to resolve Deshaney problems calls into question 
WKHZLVGRPH[SOLFDWLQJ WKH ³LQWHUQDO ORJLF´RU³LPPDQHQWPRUDOLW\´RIFULPLQDO ODZ LQ
isolation from other principles of political morality. On Approach 2, the principles of 
criminal law must, at a minimum, be compatible with the principles animating other, 
related social institutions. 
Second, criminal law theory involves questions of political legitimacy far more (and 
in different ways) than is currently supposed. Approach 2 suggests that political legitimacy 
FDQQRWEHGHULYHGVLPSO\IURPDQDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHIRUPDOSURSHUWLHVRIDVWDWH¶VSROLtical 
institutions, and its criminal justice institutions in particular.45 Rather, actual patterns of 
exercising its authority (not to mention the actual distribution of political, social, and 
economic resources that characterize a society) can significantl\DIIHFWDVWDWH¶VDXWKRULW\
to enforce criminal law. If so, then viable theories of criminal law cannot be satisfied by 
abstract inquiries concerning the point of criminalization and punishment. They should 
also aim to be sensitive toward (and productive in light of) the histories of injustice and 
oppression and facts about disagreement that describe our world. 
Third, criminal procedure (that is, institutions of policing, adjudicating, and 
punishing crime) is central to theorizing criminal law. Most straightforwardly, criminal 
procedure institutions can affect the overall legitimacy of a criminal justice system, 
WKHUHE\SRWHQWLDOO\DIIHFWLQJDVWDWH¶VDXWKRULW\WRFULPLQDOL]HDQGSXQLVKVSHFLILFW\SHVRU
tokens of conduct. Moreover, criminal procedure values (captured in the colloquial notion 
RI ³GXHSURFHVV´ FDQKDYHQRUPDWLYH VLJQLILFDQFH LQGHSHQGHQWRI WKHLU DFFXUDF\7KLV
implication suggests the non-instrumental importance of the procedures by which crime is 
policed, prosecuted, and punished.46 A viable theory of criminal law, then, would need to 
explain and defend how criminal procedure should go. 
Both Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State and The Limits of Blame
are essential reading. Both books are among the most important works in criminal law 
theory of the past ten years. Each offers compelling insights regarding the justification and 
legitimacy of criminal punishment. Apart from these insights, both books are perhaps even 
more important for what they suggest about the future of criminal law theory and (not to 
mention as) political theory. 
                                                          
 44. KELLY, supra note 29, at 123. 
 45. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, BOUNDARIES OF AUTHORITY 59±90 (2016) (discussing structural and non-
structural approaches to theorizing political legitimacy). 
 46. See Stephen R. Galoob, Retributivism and Criminal Procedure, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 465 (2017). This 
implication is somewhat in tension with the ³pragmatic´ approach to analyzing criminal procedure that Chiao 
suggests in chapter six of Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State. However, any tension might be 
resolved by construing instrumental and non-instrumental approaches to criminal procedure as complements, 
rather than as rivals. 
